The "Aryanization" of Jewish Companies And German Society (Part B)
The "Aryanization" of Jewish Companies and German Society. The Example of Hamburg . 1
Frank Bajohr, International conference: German Society's Responses to Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy 1933-1941, Yad Vashem, 10-13 February 1995.
III
While acknowledging the escalation and increased radicalization in the economic elimination of the Hamburg Jews, one should not point solely at the supposed 'change of course' in the Ministry of Economics at the end of 1937 or the legally enforced 'Aryanization' after April 1938. The main reason, I believe, was the introduction in 1936-37 of draconian measures in the foreign currency policy, a factor hardly considered by researchers until now. The establishment of the Devisenfahndungsamt (foreign currency search office) under the supervision of Heydrich on 1 August 1936, 32 the intensification of foreign currency regulations and the extension of the Devisenpruefungsdienst ( foreign currency inspection service ) led to the elimination of numerous Jewish import and export companies in Hamburg from the beginning of 1937 .33 Even vague suspicions incited the Devisenstelle des Oberfinanzpraesidenten (foreign currency office) to withdraw the powers of disposal of Jewish company owners and to 'aryanize,' or preferably liquidate their businesses. The legal basis for the anti-Jewish activities was clause 37a, which was adopted into the foreign currency regulations in December 1936. This new regulation provided for the compulsory administration in trust upon suspicion of flight of capital and thus enabled the actual expropriation of the Jewish Company. From December 1936 to October 1939 the Hamburg foreign currency office granted as many as 1,314 expropriation orders ( Sicherungsanordnungen ) against Jewish businesses, based on clause 37a. 34 The files from the foreign currency search office, which are still available almost in their entirety in the Hamburg State archives, provide an impressive documentation as to how far removed the daily behaviour of this institution of the 'Normative State' was from normative constitutional principles. The foreign currency search office demanded Entlastungsbeweise (exonerating evidence) from the accused Jews, used fictive confessions and false interrogation protocols that found their way into official files while the true facts were put away in so-called 'secret files,' denounced to the Gestapo those solicitors who had taken on Jewish clients, and applied clause 37a of the foreign currency regulation such that the effect was the same as an overall elimination of Jewish import and export companies in Hamburg. 35
The behaviour of the foreign currency search office indicated that the radicalisation of the anti-Jewish policy was not simply a matter of the 'Prerogative State' overpowering the bureaucratic 'Normative State.' Ernst Fraenkel's analysis of the 'Dual State,' which first appeared in 1940 and in which he tried to demonstrate the limited range of activity of the 'Normative State' by using the foreign currency search office as an example, 36 does not take into account the radicalisation processes in the 'Normative State' itself, which tended to withdraw itself from its norm-bound behaviour, and considered this to be a act of freeing itself from constitutional restrictions. To simply apply Fraenkel's analysis to the anti-Jewish policy in National Socialism 37 would fail to account for the much more complex reality.
The Jewish lawyer Dr. Friedrich Rosenhaft, reporting after 1945 on the attitude of the Hamburg foreign currency search office, stated that after 1933 this had got completely into the track of illegal acts of power and terror.' It had used the complex system of tax and foreign currency regulations to "excessively exaggerate" marginalia and to transfer the monetary penalties incurred into a significant source of income for the state.' The investigation offices had kept "success statistics," informed courts and state attorneys in a prejudiced manner, and applied more and more intensive methods in order to take their victims by surprise during those first unexpected' attacks and soften them to such an extent that they were prepared to deliver declarations of submission'.' This judgement is confirmed when analysing the Hamburg foreign currency files, which were marked throughout by a virulent antisemitic tone. They spoke of Jewish lack of scruples,' 39 twisted Jewish language,' Jewish black marketers' 40 and shady dealings' with which emigration-willing Jews take advantage of the facilities in our economic life in a shameless manner in order to illegally transfer Jewish capital' and therefore to sell off the assets of the German people at throw-away prices.' 41 The president of the Landesfinanzamt went so far as to claim that a Jewish suspect belonged to the Jewish existences which know no fatherland, but bestow their presence on countries in which they believe they can line their pockets at the expense of the host country.' He was therefore a people's parasite from which Germany should be freed, which would be a gain for the Reich and its economy.' 42 This hotchpotch of antisemitic arguments in the files of the Devisenstelle cannot merely be interpreted as reactions to the 'illegal' attempts of some Hamburg Jews who tried to retain some of their assets prior to them being completely expropriated. The numerous examples of anti-Jewish slander point rather to the fact the behaviour of the financial bureaucracy towards the Jews was primarily determined by antisemitic ideological convictions.
IV
Despite the central role of the 'Normative State' authorities in the process of the economic elimination of the Jews, it was not the leaders of the 'Aryanization' who took over - at least in Hamburg - state institutions such as the Devisenstelle or the Wirtschaftsbehoerde , but a party organisation, namely the Gauwirtschaftsapparat of the NSDAP. From 1936 it established itself as an institution for the approval of "Aryanization applications." 43 Its activity meant the end of contractual freedom for Jewish owners and led to drastic decreases in value of businesses for sale since the 'goodwill' fee was no longer in effect. In his approval procedure, the Gau Economic Consultant adhered to certain guidelines: Among the applicants he gave preference to young businessmen and NSDAP members; the formation of corporations should be avoided, and "Jewish influence" should be completely eradicated, which, also implied the immediate dismissal of any Jewish employees. Finally, he insisted "that the Jew should not receive an unreasonably high price" and therefore often reduced the agreed purchase price at the expense of the Jewish owners. 44
The Gau Economic Consultant maintained his leading role in the 'Aryanization' without any legal sanction. He commissioned experts and surveyors or appointed trustees to Jewish companies without juridical authorisation. This should in fact have been the task of the Chamber of Commerce or the Oberfinanzpraesident . In particular, the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce and the city treasury allowed the Gau Economic Consultant to continue with the 'Aryanization' at his own discretion. They tried to redirect the "revolutionary" energies of the Gauwirtschaftsapparat to 'Aryanization' in order to limit its activities in other sectors such as economic planning and the allotment of industry.
The Hamburg Gau Economic Consultant and his colleagues who were involved with 'Aryanization' almost all originated from the Kriegsjugendgeneration born after 1900. When the National Socialists came into power the first Gau Economic Consultant, Dr. Gustav Schlotterer, was 26 years old, his successor Carlo Otte was 24 and his successor Dr. Otto Wolff 25; the economist Karl Frie, later head of the 'Aryanization department' was 19 years old, and the lawyer in charge of 'Aryanization contracts,' Dr. Arthur Kramm, was 25. This group consisted almost entirely of ideologically oriented, academic upstarts from the lower middle class who had already joined the NSDAP in their youth. Some of them had been awarded honorary leading positions in the SS. They had little practical experience in the world of economics and some had even graduated straight from university into responsible positions. Their origin, age, experience and self-esteem significantly differentiated them from the traditional dignitary type of Hanseatic businessmen. On the whole they represented an ideologically motivated, specifically National Socialist economic elite. 45 Also characteristic of this group was the particularly intense antisemitism of the Kriegsjugendgeneration, which was widespread in the national student movements in the Weimar Republic and later played an important role in the persecutional body of the National Socialists. 46
V
The main beneficiaries of the 'Aryanization' in Hamburg were by no means the Established Hamburg commercial enterprises. Rather, the buyers of Jewish businesses were predominantly those who saw 'Aryanization' as the opportunity to establish themselves. These included former employees, up-and-coming traders who until then could not join the state-controlled foreign trade system, people changing their profession or coming from related sectors of the same profession, as well as those seeking their fortune in the wake of National Socialism who were described by Max Warburg as "disgusting subordinates."
It was the middle-class economy that profited most from the 'Aryanizations' since the liquidation of Jewish companies reduced the pressure of competition. Consequently, Hamburg's highest middle-class functionary, Christian Bartholatus, leader of the NS-Hago (National Socialist trade organisation), announced triumphantly in January 1939 that 2,000 shops were standing empty in Hamburg which, among other reasons, was mainly due to the liquidation of Jewish retail businesses .47 The Jewish chain store enterprises ( Filialbetriebe ) in Hamburg were not 'Aryanized' as a whole, but in the interests of the middle class were split up and sold separately. 48 In addition, the principles of the NSDAP Gau Economic Consultant concerning the approval of 'Aryanizations' were directed at middle-class interests with the aim of "avoiding the formation of corporations" and "encouraging the younger generation." Thus the prevailing view among researchers that 'Aryanization' encouraged the development of corporations in the German economy and proved to be disadvantageous for the bourgeoisie 49 needs correcting. The impressive 'Aryanizations' of individual Jewish large-scale enterprises have - so it seems - tended to direct research one-sidedly to the relationship between "Big Business and Aryanization." 50 It is important therefore not to overlook the fact that since most Jewish businesses belonged to the middle-class sector, 'Aryanization' should be considered on the whole as an internal change in ownership within the middle class.
Furthermore, corruption and nepotism were central phenomena of the 'Aryanizations' in Hamburg. Numerous functionaries in the Hamburg NSDAP enriched themselves from Jewish property, and the Gauleiter used the 'Aryanizations' as welcome sources of income by demanding from owners and buyers "Aryanization contributions" which he put towards the financing of the NSDAP and his minions. 51 The buyers of Jewish companies represented a thoroughly diverse spectrum - from avaricious exploiters bent on completely plundering Jewish property to sympathetic businessmen willing to pay a fair price. According to their behaviour the buyers of Jewish property can be divided typologically into three groups: 52 The first group of active and unscrupulous profiteers comprised about forty percent of all buyers. Typical of their conduct was the fact that apart from the discriminatory rules of the 'Aryanization,' they personally approached Jewish owners in order to reduce the purchase price even further and to shamelessly exploit the predicament of the owner to their own advantage. They were not satisfied with the under-valuation of inventory and warehouse stocks and the elimination of the 'goodwill,' and often introduced themselves to the owners as representatives of the NSDAP 53 in order to intimidate them and to make clear that they would not be accepted as equal partners for negotiations. Many blackmailed the Jewish owners, threatening them with denunciation or, with the intervention of the Gestapo, had their passports suspended, 54 refused to fulfil contractual commitments, or turned up in party uniform and prohibited the owners' entry into their own businesses. 55. Particularly well represented in this group were members of the NSDAP and employees of Jewish companies. Many of the 'Aryanizations' did not take place until 1938-39, when the accelerated expropriation of the Jewish businesses provided increasing possibilities for the buyers to enrich themselves on the plight of these Jews.
The second group of buyers of Jewish property, which also constituted about forty percent, can aptly be characterised by the term 'sleeping partners.' They raked in their personal profit in the course of the 'Aryanizations' - through the devaluation of inventory and stocks - but did not expose themselves and made every effort to ensure that the transfer of property was conducted, at least outwardly, according to correct procedures. The most conspicuous feature about their behaviour was their inconspicuousness. They appeared to refrain from deriving their own advantage yet made no attempt to pay the Jewish owners an appropriate and fair compensation. Since many of these buyers believed that these were 'normal' transfers of property, they did not recognise the claims of the former Jewish owners in the compensation proceedings after 1945. 56 The remaining twenty percent - the smallest group - can be described as well-meaning and sympathetic business people who tried to pay the Jewish owners appropriate compensation. Many buyers in this group were personal friends of Jews. Many had not thought of buying property until they were persuaded to do so by Jewish friends. On closer look, this type of buying contract clearly demonstrates that there were cases where buyers and Jewish owners had joined in a silent alliance against the approval authorities. They often tried to disguise the 'goodwill' - which was prohibited - in other, artificially increased assets 57 or to pay secret amounts to the Jewish owners. 58 Such transactions were well-intentioned, but as a result of the rigid National Socialist tax and contributions policy they only seldom fulfilled their purpose of suitably compensating the Jewish owners. Many Jewish owners therefore preferred to completely reject suitable remuneration and to meet a secret agreement with the buyer, who defined the purchase as an act of trustee management that would be annulled at the end of the National Socialist rule . 59
A few buyers took steps that were illegal in the eyes of National Socialist law. For example, they gave the Jewish buyers outstanding receivables from abroad which were not mentioned in the contract of sale, 60 or paid them a secret monthly pension which was also not listed in the transfer documents. 61 One buyer even personally smuggled Swiss watches and gold chains to Amsterdam and arranged for the 'goodwill' to be brought in a briefcase to another country in order to suitably compensate the Jewish owner. 62 . Even during the repressive conditions of National Socialist rule it was still possible, if the buyer was willing, to achieve a fair solution for the Jewish owners. However, such acts not only put the buyers at a considerable personal risk, but also threw significant light on the reversal of moral basic principles by 'Aryanization': He who felt obliged by the traditional principles of a businessman's code of honour and who refused to gain profit from the innocent predicament of others, i.e., preferred to remain honest, was forced to turn 'criminal' and violate current laws. It was this moral dilemma of well-meaning buyers that finally disclosed the immorality of the 'Aryanization.' Moreover, the behaviour of the third group of buyers made it clear that even in the course of `Aryanization' a minimum standard of morals could be adhered to. The buyers moved of course within a framework dictated by National Socialism, but remained as acting subjects who actively influenced the atmosphere and conditions of the transfers of property. This meant that the responsibility for repression and discrimination was not limited to the National Socialists but included also the buyers, and with them German society as a whole.
References:
32.BAK, R 58, 23a, p. 163f., circular from Heydrich to all State Police Offices dated 22 September 1936; StAH, Oberfinanzpraesident, 4, circular from the Reichsstelle fuer Devisenbewirtschaftung to the presidents of the Landesfinanzaemter-Devisenstellen dated 16 September 1936.
33.On the topic of "Aryanizations" as a result of cuurency regulations, also see: Archiv des Wiedergutmachungsamtes beim Landgericht Hamburg (Archiv WgA LGHH), Z 21664 (Jacoby, Zucker-Export), Z 2869-1 (Metallwerk Peute), Z 2660 (Arnold Bernstein Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H.), Z 995-1 (Julius Lachmann, Im- und Export), Z 3190-1 (Messrs. J. Jacobi & Co., Ex- und Import), Z 193-1 (Dammtor Lombard, Weiss & Sander).
34.StAH, Oberfinanzpraesident, 10, Report from the Oberfinanzpraesident to the Ministry of Economics dated October 1939.
35.Compare in detail Bajohr, "Arisierung ," Chapter IV.
36.Ernst Fraenkel, Der Doppelstaat , Frankfurt am Main, 1974, p. 99.
37.According to Uwe Dietrich Adam, Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich , Duesseldorf, 1972, p.359, who interpreted the radicalization of the anti-Jewish policy as " den aeusseren Widerschein des Kampfes zwischen dem totalitaeren Anspruch des Nationalsozialismus mit den Rudimenten der normenstaatlichen Ordnung ." (p. 359).
38.Ibid StAH, Oberfinanzpraesident, Str 629, p. 96, report by the Devisenstelle dated 21 January 1939.
39.Ibid R 1936/276, p. 35, report by the president of the Landesfinanzamt to the Minister of Finance dated 2 May 1936.
40.Ibid., Str 678, Vol.1, pp. 10, 17, report from the Devisenstelle dated 27 October 1939.
41.Quote from Ibid., R 1936/276, Sh.1f., 38, President of the Landesfinanzamt Unterelbe to the Minister of Finance dated 2 May 1936.
42.The participation in the 'Aryanization' by the Gau Economic Consultant considerably varied from one Gau to another. For example the Gau Economic Consultant in Baden founded a commission in February 1936 with the approval of the Baden Ministerpraesident which from then on was to process any queries relating to the activities of Jews in the economy. Apart from the Gau Economic Consultant the Treuhaender der Arbeit as well as two higher government officials from the Finance- and Economics Ministry in Karlsruhe were members of the commission. This meant that although the Gau Economic Consultant had enforced his right to participate in the 'Aryanizations,' he had to take into account the ministerial bureaucracy which pulled the brakes on a radicalization of the "Entjudung" even afterwards (see Hans-Joachim Fliedner, Die Judenverfolgung in Mannheim , Stuttgart, 1971, pp. 114, 144). In South Westphalia the Gau Economic Consultant had the right to only check 'Aryanization' agreements, whereas the actual decisions were made by the mayors and local police authorities (see Gerhard Kratzsch, Der Gauwirtschaftsapparat der NSDAP. Menschenfuehrung-"Arisierung"-Wehrwirtschaft im Gau Westfalen-Sued, Muenster, 1989, pp. 150f, 180). In Hamburg on the other hand, the Gau Economic Consultant played a hegemonial role in the approval of the 'Aryanizations' (see Bajohr, Arisierung' , Chap. IV).
43.On the publicly announced approval principles of the Gau Economic Consultant see Hamburger Tageblatt , 2 December 1938.
44.Whether this characterization of the Hamburg Gau Economic Consultant can be generalized or is merely typical of Hamburg must remain open due to the lack of empirical comparative studies. Gerhard Kratzsch arrives at another result in his study of the Gau Westfalen-Sued. There the personnel of the Gauwirtschaftsapparat comprised " gutsituierte Unternehmer und Kaufleute, Geschaeftsfuehrer der Industrie- und Handelskammern, Werksdirektoren, Betriebs- und Sparkassenleiter ." See Gerhard Kratzsch, 'Die Entjudung' der mittelstaendischen Wirtschaft im Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg,' in: Verdraengung und Vernichtung der Juden in Westfalen , Arno Herzig et al., eds, Muenster, 1994, p. 97.
45.On the significance of the Kriegsjugendgeneration see also Ernst Guenther Gruendel, Die Sendung der Jungen Generation. Versuch einer umfassenden revolutionaeren Sinndeutung der Krise, Munich, 1932; Ulrich Herbert, ''Generation der Sachlichkeit'. Die voelkische Studentenbewegung der fruehen zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland,' in: Zivilisation und Barbarei. Die widerspruechlichen Potentiale der Moderne , Frank Bajohr et al., eds., Hamburg, 1991, pp. 115-144; Ulrich Herbert, Best. Biographische Studien ueber Weltanschauung, Radikalismus und Vernunft 1903-1989, Bonn, 1996.
46. Hamburger Fremdenblatt , 11 January 1939.
47.This applies in Hamburg to Jewish chain store enterprises such as Bottina Schuh GmbH, Speiers Schuhwarenhaus, Korsetthaus Gazelle, Fiedlers Strumpflaeden. See also Bajohr, Arisierung , Chap. V.
48.For example Helmut Genschel, Verdraengung, p. 213.
49.Peter Hayes, 'Big Business and 'Aryanization' in Germany,' Jahrbuch fuer Antisemitismusforschung , 3 (1994), pp. 254-281.
50.For the Numerous examples, such as the preferential treatment of NSDAP-Kreis- and Ortsgruppenleiter, see Bajohr Arisierung', Chap. VI. On the nepotism of the Hamburg Gauleiter also see Frank Bajohr, 'Gauleiter in Hamburg. Zur Person und Taetigkeit Karl Kaufmanns,' Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1995), pp. 267-295.
51.This character description was developed on the basis of the restitution files of the Wiedergutmachungsamt at the Landgericht Hamburg and on a sample of just under three hundred individual cases altogether in which sufficient information was available concerning the behavior of the 'Aryan' buyers.
52.Archiv WgA LGHH, Z 9879/2894 (Textilgeschaeft Martin Josephs), Z 2889 (H.W. Almind Nachflg.).
53.Ibid., Z 3103 (Chemische Fabrik Rothschild & Leers).
54.Ibid., Z 2588 (Messrs. H.J. Luft).
55.The regulations for the Wiedergutmachung were often regarded as being "immoral and illegal" and many buyers at that time even described themselves as being the real victims of the political situation. For example see Ibid., U 3350-1 (Inselmann & Co.), letter from Julius Mehldau to the Landgericht Hamburg dated 17 February 1953.
56.Ibid., Z 1124 (Spedition S. Dreyer Sen. Nachf. GmbH), Z 13410 (Julius Englaender & Hinsel).
